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A discussion of The social origins of language,  
ed. Daniel Dor, Chris Knight and Jerome Lewis
Abstract. Turning to the social dimension has been an influential trend in recent 
language evolution literature, as documented by e.g. Dunbar et al. (ed. 2014), Scott-
Phillips (2014), or Pina and Gontier (ed. 2014). The social origins of language, edited 
by Daniel Dor, Chris Knight and Jerome Lewis, is of special interest, because rather 
than just being part of this trend, it aims to redefine the current discourse in language 
origins research, making it inclusive and “society first”. Collectively, the twenty 
four chapters of this volume make a powerful statement for a broad, incorporative, 
“everything counts” approach to language evolution. By demonstrating the relevance 
to language evolution research of a wide variety of social, cultural and cognitive 
factors, The social origins of language is potentially – and hopefully – a game 
changing contribution to this field of study.
Keywords: language evolution, evolution of language, language origins, social 
communication, social signaling, cultural evolution
1. Introduction
Contemporary evolutionary linguistics, or more broadly research into 
language evolution, can be seen as growing out of the philosophical tradition 
of big “origins” questions and into pursuing these questions with more 
down-to-earth, empirical methodologies of cognitive science. For quite some 
time, however, the weight of interest has been shifting from the cognitive to 
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the social. The achievement of the cognitive turn was to take the spotlight 
away from, for example, the anatomical prerequisites for speech to questions 
regarding the “language faculty”  – symbolization, mimesis, theory of mind 
and other cognitive underpinnings of language. But now, the “social turn” 
is taking it one step further: not only by putting the ontogeny and phylogeny 
of those cognitive capacities in a social context, but also by pointing to 
mechanisms and phenomena irreducible to individual cognition.
Language evolution literature has been addressing and even directly 
referencing “the social” for some time now1, but recent – and very recent 
– publications representing this trend are much more numerous. Examples 
from 2014 include Dunbar et al. (ed 2014), Scott-Phillips (2014), as well as 
The evolution of social communication in primates (ed. Pina and Gontier 
2014), which is reviewed in the present volume (Dębska 2014). However, 
The social origins of language, edited by Daniel Dor, Chris Knight and 
Jerome Lewis, holds a special place in this mix, aspiring – rightly, in my 
view – to the role of an important programmatic statement. Dor et al.’s aim 
is to redefine the current discourse in language evolution: from “genes first” 
to “society first”.
2. What’s “the social”?
A good place to start is the classic Wittgensteinian insight that all language 
is necessarily social – at least in a certain minimal way. The famous “beetle-
in-the-box” example (Wittgenstein 1987 [1953]: 100) serves as a reminder 
that language by nature is always public. Since linguistic labels are arbitrary 
and conventional, their meanings are not fixed by individual fiat but must 
instead arise dynamically through repeated communicative interaction. 
Private language is an illusion, and a solipsistic agent cannot be linguistic – 
the social group comes first.
But what does “social” mean in “The social origins of language”? This 
question is tackled head on in a couple of chapters, such as those by Sverker 
Johansson (2014), and N. J. Enfield and Jack Sidnell (2014), but the answer 
turns out to be tricky and elusive. The twenty four chapters present, in fact, 
a very diverse range of perspectives that are not easily united by any obvious 
single common ground. Here, Wittgenstein is helpful again. The reason 
 1 An early example is The Evolutionary Emergence of Language: Social Function and 
the Origins of Linguistic Form, ed. Knight et al. (2000), a volume growing out of the second 
edition of the field’s main conference, EVOLANG.
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the volume does not lose its integrity – just like with the Wittgensteinian 
“games” – is that it contains several distinct but converging senses of the 
“social”, forming threads that interweave throughout the publication to keep 
it together.
One way to construe the social origins is as the kind of selection pressures 
leading to the evolutionary emergence and development of language. 
This could mean the thesis that language evolved for communication, 
in the footsteps of Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom (1990) – and pace e.g. 
Noam Chomsky and his camp, who suggest at times that language could 
have evolved for cognition, or even for no reason in particular2. While still 
influential, the latter remains a minority view in the language evolution 
circles, and the former is  shared by a broad majority – a stance acknowledged 
(e.g. in the chapter by Johansson [2014]), but not actively defended in the 
volume.
In a related sense, the selection pressures in question need not be 
involved in shaping language directly, but rather in forming the necessary 
preconditions, or preadaptations, for language (c.f. e.g. Donald 1999; 
Hurford 1999). In this sense, the social thesis would mean that the “prime 
movers” of the hominin cognitive development were social rather than, for 
example, ecological. This point is much more nuanced, as it depends on 
what cognitive capacities one takes as prerequisites for language emergence, 
and it enjoys less universal support. Notably, Derek Bickerton (e.g. 1998; 
Calvin and Bickerton 2000) observes that complex sociality is characteristic 
of many primate species who live in large groups and exercise Machiavellian 
intelligence to navigate intricate political webs. Even monkeys can possess 
an impressively advanced social calculus allowing them e.g. to process 
transitive rank (Seyfarth and Cheney 2001), and a correlation between 
the group size and neocortex volume is well attested in primates (Dunbar 
1993), yet none of this seems to turn their communicative systems into 
anything resembling language. To Bickerton (1998), the selective “prime 
movers” behind the evolution of human-like cognition must have come 
from ecological factors, especially the challenges of extractive foraging on 
the savannah. 
 2 “We know very little about what happens when 1010 neurons are crammed into 
something the size of a basketball, with further conditions imposed by the specific manner 
in which this system developed over time. It would be a serious error to suppose that all prop-
erties, or the interesting properties of the structures that evolved, can be ‘explained’ in terms 
of ‘natural selection’.” (Chomsky 1975:59), quoted by Jackendoff (2002: 234).
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Bickerton’s work is referenced surprisingly sparingly throughout 
the volume, and his position is not confronted directly. Rather, the book 
implies a different conceptualization of cognitive evolution and of the nature 
of language. The human difference does not necessarily begin with greater 
generalized “processing power” that would form a foundation for language 
superimposed on top of it. Rather, the chapters in Dor et al.’s collection stress 
how the phylogeny of the internal cognitive capacities for language is, from 
the very beginning, immersed in a rich external social context and dependent 
on an intricate external social-cultural scaffolding.
3. Social signals and cooperation
A unifying theme central to the entire volume is the question of the honesty 
of linguistic signals – and its cooperative underpinnings. Research on 
cooperation has now become a major industry, spanning several disciplines, 
from intercultural developmental psychology to neuroeconomics. 
Cooperation is approached from various directions, from phenomenological 
to behaviouristic, and using diverse methodologies, from theoretical work 
(e.g. West et al. 2011), to experimentation (usually in the social dilemma 
games paradigm, e.g. Ledyard 1995), to computational and mathematical 
modelling (e.g. Nowak 2006). 
In language evolution, the cooperative nature of human communication 
is of absolutely critical importance. As is often emphasized, humans share 
valuable information with biologically unrelated individuals and do so without 
incurring any costs (at least, any obvious costs) to back up the honesty of the 
message. This cooperative dimension is generally recognized in the language 
evolution circles as a key theoretical challenge, or a “central puzzle” (Fitch 
2010), and so it is in the volume3. “The major transition, all of us agree, 
must have been the establishment within social groups of unprecedentedly 
co-operative, trusting relationships”, state the editors (Dor et al. 2014: 12). 
The different authors approach this issue from different angles – trust, honesty, 
reputation, reciprocity, morality, pro-sociality, normativity, collaboration, 
altruism – but almost every chapter at least acknowledges this consensus. 
Many also work out its implications in more detail.
 3 The full quote from Fitch (2010): “The cooperative sharing of information thus re-
mains a central puzzle in language evolution”, is echoed by Zlatev (2014: 249).
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3.1. From vocal grooming to reverse dominance
In two chapters aimed at theoretical syntheses, Chris Knight (2014) and 
Jordan Zlatev (2014) address the origins of distinctly human, cooperative 
sociality. Zlatev singles out four “major players” – Dunbar’s (1996) vocal 
grooming account, Deacon’s (1997) social contract account, Tomasello’s 
(2008) shared intentionality/prosociality account, and Hrdy’s (2009) 
alloparenting account – and examines them by comparing their answers to 
five questions: “Why us and not others?”, “How?”, “When?”, “What kind 
of social groups?”, and “Development?” Zlatev’s overall conclusion is that 
all four are not only possible to reconcile with multilevel selection, but 
in fact highly compatible with multilevel selection mechanisms, including 
group selection.
Dunbar’s account grows out of one of the most intriguing and important 
discoveries in language evolution research – the correlation between 
primate non-visual neocortex volume and group size (also length of the 
juvenile period: see Joffe 1997) – but Zlatev rightly notes its shortcomings: 
vocal grooming by itself does not have to lead to humanlike sociality or 
communication (see also e.g. Johansson 2005: 213). One should also 
observe that vocal grooming, unlike real grooming, is a cheap signal, so its 
communicative functioning presupposes rather than explains the existence 
of a cooperative context (see Power 1998). 
Zlatev is relatively sympathetic to Deacon’s “marriage/male 
provisioning” account, which envisages the males as “forced” to cooperate 
with the females to provision unusually altricial hominin infants, this 
cooperation being governed by symbolically mediated social norms. 
That said, Zlatev’s highlight on the group-selection elements, though not 
unfounded, seems to be overstated: “male provisioning” is defensible 
in terms of individual reproductive success of offspring benefitting from 
greater parental investment4.
Tomasello’s shared intentionality/prosociality account is very well 
established in the language evolution literature, but Hrdy’s alloparenting 
proposal – convergent with Tomasello’s in many respects – has recently 
received growing recognition. Hrdy’s central insight lies in observing that 
non-human primates can in fact exhibit highly cooperative social patterns: 
in providing collective, group-level care to offspring. Where humans are 
special is in combining this pattern of cooperative breeding specific to (some) 
 4 It should also be remembered that Deacon himself considers “male provisioning” 
merely as a scenario, additional rather than central to his now classic 1997 book.
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monkeys with advanced cognition characteristic of the Great Apes. Zlatev 
observes that although Hrdy’s proposal fails to provide candidate selection 
pressures behind this unique combination, it identifies the preexisting 
platform of trust on which intersubjectivity and prosociality can grow; this 
makes her account not only compatible, but also complementary with that 
of Tomasello.
In his review chapter, Chris Knight (2014) agrees that symbols require 
trust, but he offers an insight that goes deeper. Following the argument 
developed in Camilla Power’s (2014a) chapter, Knight emphasizes that 
normally in animal communication a small ‘efficacy’ cost of transmitting 
the information must be accompanied by a large ‘strategic’ cost of proving 
that the information is true (see e.g. Maynard Smith and Harper 2003). 
This cannot work for symbolic communication. Language, Knight argues, 
is a lie not only in the sense of potentially conveying false propositional 
content, but much more immediately, in each word being a fake: a fiction 
not certified for its veracity by a large strategic cost. If each symbol had to 
be proven true, token by token, it would be next to impossible to transcend 
one-symbol utterances and achieve combinatorial meaning. Hence, 
social agreement has a much more fundamental role to play in symbolic 
communication than purely establishing the sign’s reference: first of all, 
it mandates believing in the sign. Symbolic communication requires taking 
symbols as true without demanding proof, that is suspending the disbelief 
which is the default condition in communication by nonhumans.
Central to Knight’s standpoint is the notion of reproductive levelling. 
In social groups with appreciable reproductive skew, males have incentives 
to vie for dominance over the rest of the group, as this ensures greater 
reproductive success. But increasing size of hominin groups and increasing 
Machiavellian intelligence of the groups’ members create more opportunities 
for subordinates to form powerful coalitions that could successfully subvert 
the position of the leader and undermine his (Darwinian) payoff. With 
successful counter-dominance strategies in place, competing for status only 
poorly translates into fitness advantages, which leads to groups being more 
egalitarian and more cooperative. Thus, symbols depend on cooperation, 
which in turn depends on egalitarian social patterns (not accidentally so 
characteristic of present-day hunter-gatherers). Knight provides an overview 
of several theoretical positions on each of those issues, and as the last – 
chronologically, first – step, he sees the likely origins of egalitarianism 
in female coalitions. Here he mentions the accounts by Sarah Hrdy and 
Kristen Hawkes, but sides with the Female Cosmetic Coalitions (FCC) 
model.
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3.2. Female Cosmetic Coalitions
The author of the FCC model, Camilla Power, has contributed two texts 
to the volume, Chapters 4 and 15. The first one (Power 2014a) serves to 
set the stage: working from rigorously Darwinian assumptions about 
cooperation and signalling, she delves deeper into the special status 
of language, which functions by combining elements that are individually 
unsubstantiated “fakes”5. She also views group size – with resulting increased 
encephalisation and Machiavellian intelligence – as promoting counter-
dominance and reverse dominance strategies, which in turn lead to egalitarian 
social patterns. What is more, as competition for social intelligence favours 
greater investment in large-brained but altricial offspring, hominin females 
face intense pressures for mobilizing male provisioning and blocking male 
philandering. 
Those are the foundations of the Female Cosmetic Coalitions (FCC) 
model, which Power presents in the later chapter (2014b). Its key component 
is menstruation – given concealed ovulation of the human female, the only 
visible sign of her reproductive status and imminent fertility (also one of the 
most central themes in present-day hunter-gatherer cultures). This may 
provoke conflict both between males – for sexual access – and females – for 
maintaining the investment of males, who may be tempted to desert their 
currently non-cycling partners to pair with the cycling females. On Power’s 
FCC account, hominin females would have taken counter-measures 
by forming a coalition dedicated to collectively “jamming” the menstrual 
signal. They would have applied red cosmetics to their bodies, which would 
have masked their status and (even more importantly) signalled solidarity, 
forcing the males to seek sexual favours on the terms of the female coalition 
rather than their own. Cosmetic adornments, originally proto-ritual displays 
indexically referring to menstrual blood, would then have evolved into more 
elaborate symbolic rituals standing for female collective denial of sex; such 
rituals would be the original source of a group’s repertoire of shared fictions.
The chapter by Ian Watts (2014) fleshes out this scenario with 
archaeological detail. Most evidence in favour of the FCC model has to do 
 5 “Signal evolution theory is the main body of theory applied to animal communi-
cation. So it is axiomatic that any scientific study of the evolution of language adopts this 
theoretical approach as starting point. To argue that the evolution of language is a special case 
to which signalling theory does not apply, we have to explain why not, within that theory’s 
terms… We are not systematically monitoring for lies or liars. Indeed, language is in a sense 
built from components which are ‘lies’–figures of speech whose ‘truth’ emerges only on 
a higher combinatorial level.” (Power 2014a: 50)
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with the use of red ochre, arguably the oldest archaeological trace of human 
activity that can be linked to symbolism of any kind6. Watts points to several 
facts, such as the kind of ochre used or correlations with encephalisation: 
the blood-red types of ochre were preferred to other colours, regular ochre 
use appears to co-occur with the last brain growth spurt in the Middle Stone 
Age, and finally, in Europe ochre use seems to follow a pattern of being less 
intense in the periods where ecological conditions produced birth seasonality 
(which would have reduced opportunities for male philandering, so that 
female coalitions would have had less demand for cosmetic rituals).
Watts’ review of the evidence is admirably detailed and informative, but 
it also remains a sobering reminder of the limits of evidential power of the 
archaeological and fossil records, which can provide only most general 
grounding to the more advanced human origin models, such as the FCC. 
Inferences, when not disappointingly cautious, quickly become far-fetched: 
there is very little that fossil and archaeological record can legitimately tell 
us on the exact shape of Middle Stone Age ritual practices or social norms7. 
A good example of fallible reasoning is when Watts takes the postulated 
increase in brain size in the MSA to mean that modern language was not yet 
present at that time (contra what Dediu and Levinson [2014] have to say 
in their chapter). But why would language have put a stop to pressures for 
greater brainpower? This runs counter to the logic of authors such as Dor and 
Jablonka (2014), whereby culture, fuelled by increasingly effective symbolic 
communication, installs a feedback loop working to promote, not suppress, 
encephalisation.
Overall, the FCC is a complex model with many merits, such as accounting 
for the deep symbolic meaning of menstruation in hunter-gatherer societies, 
 6 A number of more ancient artefacts exist, including the recently reported engraved 
fossil shell dating back to about 500 000 years ago (Joordens et al. 2014), whose interpreta-
tion, however, is much more controversial.
 7  “There seem to have been significant obstacles to establishing a form of social or-
ganization that allowed some individuals to remain at a home base, indefinitely maintain-
ing captured wildfire. Speculatively, these may have concerned an absence of mechanisms 
of punishment and reward to enforce cooperation between strangers, a prerequisite of ‘insti-
tutional facts’.” (Watts 2014: 215)
“Intriguingly, cut-marks on bone are more abundant and randomly oriented than 
in later Levantine contexts, suggesting that more individuals were involved, with little or 
no formal apportioning of meat (Stiner et al. 2009). This might be read as another indication 
of an absence or weak development of institutional facts.” (Watts 2014: 215)
“The Wonderwerk pigments strongly suggest collective ritual dating back to 300–
500 kya, with fire-lit ‘song-and-dance’ performances, the dancers glowing red and glittering.” 
(Watts 2014: 217)
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and emphasizing the role of costly ritual in establishing social norms. That 
said, the repeated assertions of testability are overstated. The predictions 
it generates fit empirical data in ways that are appealing, but post-factum and 
vulnerable to confirmation bias; also, as mentioned above, archaeological 
data by their nature allow for only loose fit. The FCC remains an interesting 
contender, but one must remember that each step of this elaborate and multi-
step scenario needs to be treated as somewhat speculative.
3.3. Why talk? The concept of risk-free killing
Yet another perspective on the topic of trust and evolutionary stability 
of communication comes from Jean-Louis Dessalles (2014). He formulates 
this problem with rare succinctness: “If information has any value, it is in the 
interest of no one to give it for free. And if information has no value, why 
are there ears ready to listen to it?” (Dessalles 2014: 284). Here, Dessalles’ 
principal interest lies in the “talker” rather than the “listener”. While most 
theorizing focuses on the receiver’s risks of being manipulated, Dessalles, 
admirably, asks us to consider the reverse question: what benefits does 
the sender derive from producing the message, given that consistent 
deception is not an option if communication is to be evolutionarily stable? 
In other words, why talk?
Dessalles points to the basic facts of human ethology, citing Geoffrey 
Miller’s (2000) observation that where we compete is to speak rather 
than to listen8. Humans find talking inherently gratifying, which suggests 
it must have had adaptive value but does not tell us its exact nature. 
To Dessalles, the Darwinian answer is that using language is competitive 
signaling. Speakers want to show off, and they accomplish this by making 
their conversational turns relevant and imbuing them with highly desirable 
qualities: unexpected information, emotional content, and logical 
consistency. Even if the information conveyed is trivial rather than important 
(as is commonly the case in conversation), the speaker whose contributions 
meet the above criteria demonstrates cognitive characteristics which would 
make him a valued ally in the human EEA (Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptedness).
To explain this last point, Dessalles turns the reader’s attention to 
the phenomenon of risk-free killing. The main technological innovation 
in early hominins were stone tools, and one consequence of being able to 
 8 Fitch (2010) proposes a term derived from German, Mitteilungsbedürfnis, to capture 
the human urge to share information and emotions with others.
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use a stone tool effectively is being able to use it as a weapon. Assassination 
becomes an option. Unarmed, killing a competitor requires having enough 
strength and social support to overcome not just the opponent but also any 
individuals that might come to his rescue; even then the encounter may prove 
risky and costly. Weapons change this dramatically, as almost everyone 
becomes capable of dealing a lethal blow to a sleeping rival. The only 
protection, Dessalles notes, is having vigilant allies – and vigilance is best 
advertised in precisely those conversational contributions that are relevant 
and logical, and have unexpected content and emotional impact.
In my opinion, the concept of risk-free killing is the stronger part 
of Dessalles’ scenario, and potentially a key idea in hominin evolution. 
Weapons, and the decreased costs of killing dominant individuals that came 
with them, would have had two related consequences, both very important. 
Firstly, social hierarchies would have depended even less on physical power 
and even more on social skills, which would have added fuel to the arms 
race of Machiavellian intelligence (with all the consequences to brain size, 
neonate altriciality, and group organization for infant provisioning). Secondly, 
the possibility of (almost) everyone to have in check (almost) everyone else 
would have constituted a powerful drive for social levelling. Those two points 
deserve closer attention from scholars whose models prioritise the social 
brain as well as counter-dominance and reverse dominance. Dessalles’ 
account, in turn, would be more complete if he factored in the possible 
pressures from inter-group conflict: killing a member of one’s own to replace 
him in hierarchy pays off immediately, but has an equally immediate cost 
of making the group more vulnerable to attacks from rival bands, resulting 
in its physical as well as genetic obliteration.
4. Culture
The role of culture in language emergence could be seen as another common 
thread, even though it may be better understood as not one but two distinct 
insights. Firstly, we have the cumulative potential of the cultural mechanisms 
of invention and innovation, most successfully captured in the ratchet effect 
analogy (e.g. Tomasello 1999). Innovation in a group would normally be lost 
after each generation, but cultural transmission acts as a pawl preventing 
the reset. By culturally inheriting the innovation, the new generation no 
longer has to start from scratch, and rather than devoting their lifetimes to 
reinventing the state of the art, they can “pick it up from there” and devote 
those lifetimes to advancing it further on. 
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Secondly, we have the phenomenon of gene-culture co-evolution, 
first introduced into language evolution by Terrence Deacon, whose work 
is widely acknowledged throughout the volume. Deacon (1997) illustrated 
his case with the example of the human adaptation for post-weaning lactose 
tolerance, evolved along the Baldwinian lines. With culturally invented and 
transmitted technology of milk processing, such as fermenting or making 
cheese, milk would slowly become available as a food source to human 
adults in certain populations; this would increase their reliance on milk and 
dairy and result in a selection pressure for inborn lactose tolerance, leading 
to an even greater dependence on milk products and thus stimulating further 
technological progress in a gene-culture positive feedback loop.
Daniel Dor and Eva Jablonka (2014) offer an analogy of their 
own: the latent skill of echolocation. In humans it manifests itself to an 
appreciable degree only under rare circumstances, yet in a fantastic but at 
least conceptually possible scenario, in an isolated population of blind people 
this skill could be useful enough to make a difference. Not only could we 
expect Darwinian selection for it, but also that the development of this skill 
in ontogeny would be encouraged, and that technology and culture would be 
gradually redefined and “built around it”, to assist and promote it on the one 
hand and exploit it on the other; all this would culminate in increasing natural 
selection to close the positive feedback loop. Likewise, language evolution 
is “phenotype-first”, fuelled by developmental plasticity that is magnified 
by cultural-technological progress.
The step further that Dor and Jablonka want us to take, and the novelty 
of their proposal, is that the phenotype in “phenotype-first” is cultural rather 
than individual. The way language is different from lactose tolerance or 
echolocation is that it inevitably transcends a single person. It is no use for 
a lone individual – language necessarily means interaction between several 
minds, implying not just individual, but collective creativity. By its own 
nature, language involves group-level innovation. Each communication 
act unavoidably taps the advantages of brainstorming, leading to gains 
that exceed the sum of individual contributions: “group genius” over “lone 
genius”. Collaborative innovation drives fast change in communicative 
technology, which can then be recursively applied to itself: as tools may be 
used to make better tools, emerging language becomes a means of promoting 
even more trust, collaboration and creativity.
Several other texts in the volume look into the role of cultural 
transmission, to a various extent. For example, Enfield (2014) looks 
into cultural epidemiology, specifically aiming at a more principled 
account of transmission biases (roughly equivalent to selection pressures 
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in biological evolution). He puts forward a model of a four-stage cycle 
of cultural transmission: exposure (of an individual to the cultural “meme”) 
– representation (encoding the “meme” in the memory) – reproduction 
(when the individual retrieves and uses the “meme”) – material (the 
physical properties of the external representation); each stage involves a set 
of characteristic transmission biases. Enfield emphasizes the role of iterated 
practice in language, which goes beyond the standard iterated learning 
approach by closing up on the enchronic timescale: “the timescale of moves 
and countermoves in sequences of human interaction” (2014: 327).
5. What is language?
“Your theory of language evolution depends on your theory of language”, 
says Ray Jackendoff (2010). The debate between the proponents of the narrow 
delineation of what can legitimately be called language and the advocates 
of a broader, integrative view (Hauser et al. 2002, Pinker and Jackendoff 2005; 
see also Wacewicz 2012, and Wacewicz and Żywiczyński, this volume) has 
been alive for more than a decade, and it continues to shape the controversies 
in the field. It may well be that the most important contribution of The social 
origins of language is not arguing for anything social per se, but rather 
making a consistent, convincing and powerful statement about the “broad” 
nature of language, and as a result championing the need for an all-inclusive 
perspective on its study. The introductory chapter, remarkable for its apt 
phrasing of many points, puts it eloquently:
With the rise of a multitude of new sub-disciplines, specialized 
journals, and conferences, and with the gradual decline of the 
Chomskian paradigm as a unifying framework, more and more 
of what we learn about language remains confined to specialized 
professional circles. However, to understand the origin of language 
requires a move in the opposite direction – a large-scale, collective 
interdisciplinary effort at theoretical synthesis. The detective-like 
analysis of circumstantial evidence knows no disciplinary borders. 
Everything counts. (Dor et al. 2014: 1–2)
…a very wide spectrum of entangled conditions is required–
cultural, social, political, cognitive, and emotional. In other words, 
language is an internal component of a much wider continuum: 
social intercourse and culture in distinctively human form. This, 
then, is why the problem is so difficult: to explain language, we 
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seem to need nothing short of ‘a theory of everything’– everything 
distinctive about human consciousness, life, and culture taken as 
a whole. (Dor et al. 2014: 12)
Language is not just a biological adaptation. The conceptualization 
of the language faculty only in terms of the organism’s genetic make-up 
is incomplete, and Chris Sinha (2014) explains why by usefully analogizing 
language to animal artefactual niches, such as the bower in bowerbirds. 
As products of behavioral instructions largely coded in the organisms’ 
genes, artefacts are organisms’ creations – but the reverse is also true. 
Animals such as bowerbirds, beavers or termites are profoundly affected 
by their artefacts, which literally form the animals’ niches, indispensable for 
their daily functioning, survival and reproduction, and equally heritable as 
genes. This analogy argues against taking biological and cultural evolution 
separately, and for treating the evolving entities as biocultural complexes: 
“phenogenotypes”.
Another of the volume’s excellent analogies is found in Charles 
Whitehead’s (2014) chapter, who – building on the insights of Émile 
Durkheim and Chris Knight – notes that “…any attempt to explain language 
as an isolated trait is akin to explaining the emergence of the credit card 
without considering the preconditions on which credit cards depend–
including commerce, money, banking, the digital computer, and the means 
to detect and punish fraud” (Whitehead 2014: 157). Accordingly, approaches 
that focus selectively on the formal combinatorial properties of the human 
language faculty can be compared to studying the structural and material 
properties of the plastic plate. This is not to question their validity or 
usefulness; problems begin when such a narrow approach is claimed to 
exhaust the scope of what is interesting or possible to know about language 
and its origins (cf. Wacewicz and Żywiczyński, this volume).
And what is interesting about language clearly cannot be narrowly 
limited to grammar or, for example, vocally transmitted information. In his 
chapter, Adam Kendon (2014) argues compellingly that extra-oral visible 
bodily action – communicative movements of the hand and arm, but also 
a variety of other signals such as movements of the trunk or head, or facial 
action – is an integral, essential and inalienable component of language9. 
 9 “Extra-oral visible bodily action, in short, is deployed by speakers in ways that serve 
a great diversity of semantic functions but which yet, if done while the person is speaking, are 
so closely co-ordinated with this activity that it is to be understood as an integrated component 
of it.” (Kendon 2014: 68)
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Extra-oral visible bodily actions, rather than being random “supplements 
[or] add-ons” to vocal signals, are patterned (rule governed), semantic 
(individually meaningful or related to the meanings expressed vocally), and 
very deeply integrated with speech. As a result, we should treat speech and 
the various visible expression systems as an ensemble, and “[a]ny theory 
of the evolutionary origins of language needs to take [extra-oral visible 
bodily action] into account” (2014: 71)10.
Kendon calls our attention to ways in which human linguistic activity 
is not only multimodal, but also depends extensively on semiotic means 
other than symbolic signs. Jerome Lewis (2014) does the same in discussing 
multimodal communication in the Central African BaYaka Pygmy groups, 
modern hunter-gatherer representatives of the most ancient genetic lineages 
of humankind. Their daily communicative practices consist in versatile 
drawing on a variety of means of expression, from words, to reenactment, 
to different forms of music (themselves forming a continuum with speaking), 
to sonic mimesis: mimicked sounds that can be used flexibly in conversation 
to substitute conventional lexical labels. Lewis highlights how different this 
is from the default assumptions about the nature of language, especially 
those that present-day Western researchers, with their lifetime immersion 
in the written word, unwittingly bring to the study of language origins:
Mbendjele and other Pygmy groups’ multi-modal communicative 
strategies targeting different audiences remind us of the 
environmentally embedded context of language use likely to 
have dominated in the past. BaYaka seek to speak as many 
‘languages’ (djoki) as they can. Their speech is incorporative, 
open, encompassing, and inclusive. It is a skilful multi-modal 
deployment of a range of capacities inherent to human bodies that 
serve to establish relationships with as many creatures as possible. 
By contrast, most language users today think of languages as 
conceptually fixed to a distinctive vocabulary, grammar, and speech 
style, facilitating interaction between members of a particular 
human group, and as being political by being selective, exclusive, 
and oppositional. (Lewis 2014: 85)
 10 Some may find it surprising that Kendon does not support any of the “gesture first” 
theories of language origins (e.g. Corballis 2002); but this is precisely for the reason just de-
scribed – emphasis on the visual rather than vocal modality would face the same problem with 
explaining the deep integration between the modalities.
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6. The language mosaic
Overall, the twenty four chapters give us a broad, complex, and multifaceted 
vision of language evolution: what Hurford (2003) calls mosaic evolution 
or what Knight (personal communication) calls jigsaw evolution, as 
opposed to the magic ingredient X evolution scenarios which seek to reduce 
language origins to a single crucial component. Again, this inclusive position 
is something that Dor, Knight and Lewis take special effort to emphasize: 
“On one point, we are all agreed: languages began evolving as a consequence 
not of one social factor but multiple interacting ones. This, then, is our 
overall thesis” (2014: 4). As the editors say, “everything counts”, including 
“shared childcare, the control of fire and cooking, projectile weapons, 
big game hunting, increasingly equal power relations between the sexes, 
emotional bonding through music, dance and other forms of ritual – and, as 
a consequence of increased trust within relatively stable coalitions, steadily 
increasing chances for cultural innovations to be preserved and transmitted 
to future generations.” (2014: 4)
It is impossible to do justice here to all twenty four texts in the volume. 
In the chapters not discussed above, Sverker Johansson (2014) looks into 
accessible sources of evidence in which to ground a language origins theory; 
Nick Enfield and Jack Sidnell (2014) demonstrate that one such source may 
be Conversation Analysis; Daniel Dor (2014) develops the view of language 
as a communication technology (introduced in the chapter co-authored with 
Jablonka); Simeone Pika (2014) reviews a wealth of information on visual 
communication in apes, with emphasis on chimpanzee gestures; Zanna 
Clay and Klaus Zuberbühler (2014), in contrast, focus on ape vocalisations, 
warning against writing them off as uninteresting emotional reactions; 
Dediu and Levinson (2014) overview a broad range of archaeological, 
paleoanthropological and linguistic evidence, all consistent with modern 
language being present as early as 500 000 years ago; Emily Wyman 
(2014) is interested in language as a tool for doing things, and in the social 
prerequisites for enabling such performativity; this is related to Ehud Lamm’s 
(2014) interest in normativity as such a precondition, but also something that 
grows together with language in a co-evolutionary dynamics; in another co-
evolutionary account, Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka (2014) look into 
the power of lexical labels as cognitive enhancers, presenting word-based 
episodic recall as a crucial cognitive novelty; Chris Knight and Jerome 
Lewis (2014) build on their previous chapters, working towards a scenario 
of language origins from vocal mimesis; and Luc Steels’ (2014) aim is to pull 
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down what he sees as a number of false dichotomies: between synchrony and 
diachrony, nature and culture, competence and performance, processing and 
describing, and formalism and functionalism.
Because of the richness of the collection, there are a number of quite 
fundamental recurrent threads which I could not address: for example, 
the role of ritual (Knight, Lahm, Lewis, Power, Watts, Whitehead), the role 
of play and pretend-play (Dor, Ginsburg and Jablonka, Power, Whitehead, 
Wyman), and the idea of language as a medium for creating nonphysical 
but binding reality of Durkheimian institutional facts (Knight, Power, Watts, 
Wyman).
Collectively, the twenty four chapters deliver a clear message: no single 
discipline or research trend “owns” the field of language evolution. There 
is room there for conversation analysis, cultural anthropology/ethnography, 
gesture studies, robotics, and so on. Just as cooperation in hominid groups 
must have been a crucial prerequisite and a central piece in the puzzle 
of language emergence, cooperation across disciplinary borders will be 
a crucial prerequisite for solving it.
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